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Abstract: Accident Precursor Analysis (APA) serves as the bridge between existing risk modeling 
activities, which are often based on historical or generic failure statistics, and system anomalies, which 
provide crucial information about the failure mechanisms that are actually operative in the system and 
which may differ in frequency or type from those in the various models. These discrepancies between 
the models (perceived risk) and the system (actual risk) provide the leading indication of an under- 
appreciated risk. This paper presents an APA process developed specifically for NASA Earth-to-Orbit 
space systems. The purpose of the process is to identify and characterize potential sources of system 
risk as evidenced by anomalous events which, although not necessarily presenting an immediate safety 
impact, may indicate that an unknown or insufficiently understood risk-significant condition exists in 
the system. Such anomalous events are considered accident precursors because they signal the 
potential for severe consequences that may occur in the future, due to causes that are discernible from 
their occurrence today. Their early identification allows them to be integrated into the overall system 
risk model used to intbrm decisions relating to safety. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Accident Precursor Analysis (APA) process presented herein provides a systematic means of 
meeting the relevant requirements within NASA Procedural Requirement (NPR) 8715.3C, NASA 
General Safety Program Requirements [I 1 by evaluating anomaly occurrences for their system safety 
implications and, through both analytical and deliberative methods: identifying those that portend 
more serious consequences to come if effective corrective action is not taken. APA builds upon 
existing safety analysis processes currently in practice within NASA. leveraging their results to 
provide an improved understanding of overall system risk. As such, APA represents an important 
dimension of safety evaluation: as operational experience is acquired, precursor information is 
generated such that it can be fed back into system safety analyses to risk-inform safety improvements. 
The purpose of the APA process is to identify and characterize potential sources of system risk for 
which indications are received in the form of anomalous events which. although not necessarily 
presenting an immediate safety impact. may indicate that an unknown or insufficiently understood 
risk-significant condition exists in the system. Such anomalous events are considered accident 
precursors because they signal the potential for more severe consequences that may occur in the 
future, due to causes that are discernible from their occurrence today. Their early identification allows 
them to be fully scrutinized and the results to he used to inform decisions relating to safety. In addition 
to a systematic analysis of the anomalous event that was actually observed (a hallmark of all APA 
processes including the NRC process used as a point-of-departure), the NASA process also invokes an 
"imaginative" aspect to the process using a structured brainstorming session to identify similar 
anomalous conditions which could have more severe consequences than the observed anomalous 
event. In the context of NASA systems, the term severe consequences typically refers to loss of crew 
(LOC), loss of vehicle (LOV), or loss of mission (LOM). It is up to the particular project employing 
the approach to define severe consequences appropriate to its objectives and apply the technical 
approach accordingly. For instatlce. science missions may consider loss of science (LOS) to he a 
severe consequence. 
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The APA process presented in this document is specifically tailored to Earth-to-Orbit Space 
Transportation Systems, although the fundamental process steps are valid for other mission classes 
(e.g., manned and unmanned orbital platforms, manned lunar and planetary outposts, deep-space 
robotic missions, and other human space exploration missions), and may be tailored to the specific 
needs of each class. Current programs at NASA that can benefit from the APA process presented in 
this document include the Space Shuttle. certain Constellation systems, and (with appn~priate 
tailoring) the International Space Station. In addition, NASA is continuing to exercise a robust 
terrestrial and solar system satellite and robotic based science agenda that would benefit from a 
systematic accident precursor analysis process. In this case, an accident precursor process could 
provide valuable information to guide the design of future scientific missions as well as indicate when 
corrective actions are required during the mission to preclude potential mission-ending failures. APA 
guidance focusing on these other mission classes is expected to he produced in the near-future. 
2. FUNDAMENTALS OF ACCIDENT PRECURSOR ANALYSIS 
The Swiss Cheese model of accident causation. originally proposed by James Reason [Zj, likens a 
system's defenses against severe failure as a series of slices of randomly-holed Swiss Cheese arranged 
vertically and parallel to each other with gaps in between each slice. Each slice could represent a 
safety process, preventative maintenance. a subsystem. adverse environmental condition, etc. The 
holes represent latent conditions, possible severe stresses, opportunities for human error, or simply 
specific subsystem failures. Essentially, the holes in the cheese slices represent individual weaknesses 
in the system to various events and conditions. and are continually varying in size and position in all 
slices. Using the Swiss Cheese model, an accident can be represented as a trajectory through a 
momentary alignment in a set of holes (as shown by the red line in Figure I) .  In other words. a failure 
mechanism can sequentially negotiate these holes thus compromising a barrier meant to obviate 
catastrophe and snowball to a full-blown accident. Whenever a failure mechanism manages to make it 
through one or more holes, hut not all. it is effectively deflected from continuing to a severe 
consequence (as shown by the blue line in Figure I) and it is cataloged as an anomaly. 
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Figure 1: "Swiss Cheese" Model to Accident Causation 
Therefore an anomlous event makes an organization aware of weaknesses in the system that may, in 
combination with other potential weaknesses, lead to a severe consequence. If there is indeed potential 
for more weaknesses to align with the observed weaknesses in such a way to lead to an accident. then 
the event can he called an accident prectirsor since it portends the potential for more severe 
consequences if the failure mechanism were to recur. 
Some examples of accident precursor types are: 
A near-miss because of chance or an opportune mitigation 
Faults that can become failure conditions without correction 
Unexpected trend in test or operation 
Reduced maintenance effectiveness 
Unexpected effects from aging of equipment 
Common causes of faults or deteriorations 
Three well-known examples of accident precursors are: 
O-ring blow-by at Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) joint locations, prior to the loss 
of the Challenger; 
Foam loss from the Space Shuttle External Tank (ET) and Space Shuttle Thermal Protection 
System (TPS) debris damage, prior to the loss of Columbia; 
Increased containment air filter flow-rate deterioration, prior to the discovery of significant 
vessel head erosion at the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant. 
Accident precursor analysis (APA) is the process by which an organization evaluates observed 
anomalies and determines if their risk significance is indicative of a potential accident precursor. 
There is no one way to conduct APA. but all APA processes should evaluate operational andlor test 
experience to identify unrecognized accident potential or underappreciated vulnerabilities. so that 
something can be done about them in a timely mannef. 
3. NASA ACCIDENT PRECURSOR ANALYSIS PROCESS OVERVIEW 
APA establishes a systematic process for risk significance-based evaluation of operational and test 
anomalies by: 
Screening observed anomalies for the need to perform an evaluation 
Postulation of anomalous conditions related to the original anomalous event 
Evaluating and grading anomalous conditions for further analysis 
Performing detailed analysis of selected anomalous conditions 
The NASA APA process may be applied as soon as there are anomalous events that will impinge upon 
the current or impending operation of a particular system. In some cases this may be as early as the 
preliminary design review (PDR) in the development portion of the system life cycle. For instance, if 
the design solution at PDR includes heritage equipment from previous NASA programslprojects or 
even external applications of that equipment, the anomalies that have historically occurred on that 
"In a timely manner" is a matier to be determined by the organi~ation overseeing the system (as will he 
discussed in subsequent sections) hut basically is defined by the end result - which is the avoidance of an 
accident due to a recurring failure mechanism. 
equipment can be evaluated to determine what, if any, risks they portend for the system being 
designed. Once prototype subsystems begin testing, usually between PDR and the critical design 
review (CDR), test anomalies can be evaluated to both inform the Failure Modes & Effects Analysis 
(FMEA) as well as integrating the results of the APA into any nascent system risk models. The 
combined findings can, of course, be utilized to effect design changes that may eliminate or mitigate 
unacceptable risks early in the design process when the cost of making those changes is relatively low. 
After the system begins operation. it is prudent to continue applying the APA process to root out 
under-appreciated risks and to identify new risks that crop up as the system processes. missions. and 
operating environments change, or in the case of reusable systems, as they simply begin to show signs 
of degradation due to aging. 
Figure 2 presents a high-level view of the conceptual framework of NASA's APA approach. The 
process begins with a review of anomalous events as reported in existing databases [e.g., Problem 
Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) database], and a screening out of those events that can be 
judged by either manual or automated inspection as having no practical relationship to any potentially 
risk-significant condition existing in the system of interest. This is necessary because almost any such 
database will tend to include many reports of no real interest to an APA, and it is important not to 
spend too much effort on such reports. 
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Figure 2: NASA Accident Precursor Analysis Process Overview Diagram 
3.1. Generalization 
Events surviving this preliminary screen, meant to include all but the most clearly non-risk significant 
events (to minimize false negatives), are assessed for their causal failure mechanisms. These 
mechanisms are then generalized to different circumstances under which they might recur in the 
system, including the possibility of recurrence in different subsystems, at different times, or with 
different fault magnitudes. These generalized. postulated occurrences of the failure mechanism are 
referred to as generalized potential failrcres (GPFsI, and characterize the potential for the failure 
mechanism that caused the observed anomaly to occur elsewhere in the system, with potentially more 
severe results. 
Generalization instills within the APA process the ability to go beyond the circumstantial aspects of 
the anomaly as it occurred, to the spectrum of possible instantiations of the causal failure mechanism, 
i.e., what might occur. The scope of generalization goes beyond the immediate issue of assessing and 
mitigating the anomaly itself. Instead, generalization is focused on the anomaly's causal failure 
mechanism as it might arise in other circumstances. in order to identify design or operational 
vulnerabilities to the failure mechanism in a bmader sense. Generalization produces a set of GPFs 
which. together with the anomaly itself. comprise the anomalous conditions that characterize the 
potential for the underlying failure mechanism to occur in the system as a whole. Anomaly 
generalization is illustrated in Figure 3, with the expanding cone representing the increasing number of 
GPFs originating from the initial anomaly review. 
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Figure 3: Anomaly Generalization Illustration 
The output of generalization is a set of anomalous conditions deemed worthy of further evaluation and 
grading. Subsequent grading of these anomalous conditions involves an evaluation of their potential to 
produce severe consequences. This potential depends on the physical locations and functional roles of 
the affected components. 
3.2. Data Gathering & Rule-Based Screening 
Following generalization. data on each of the anomalous conditions is collected, as well as sufficient 
system-level data to evaluate the potential for actual system failure to occur, given the presence of the 
failure mechanism, and the potential for the failure to propagate to severe consequences. Since both 
anomalies and GPFs are subsumed under the general heading of anomalous conditions, the individuals 
or teams gathering the data treat each equally without regard to whether it is an actual anomaly or a 
postulated GPF. This is important since the data collectors may be swayed by the rigor they put into 
searching for relevant information based on whether they perceive the anomalous condition to be a 
"real anomaly". The data collected in this step are in addition to the anomaly-related data that have 
already been collected and used for puiposes such as indentifying the anomaly failure mechanism. 
Anomalies and identified GPFs (herein simply jointly referred to as anomalolrs conditions) are then 
screened using "rule-based criteria, to eliminate those for which deterministic information can be 
brought to bear to demonstrate their lack of risk significance. This rule-based step is comparable to 
that used in the NRC precursor analysis process [31, with the significant difference that the NRC 
criteria have been developed over years of application. 
3.2. Deliberative Grading 
Since the NASA APA process is in its infancy, for those anomalous conditions that cannot he screened 
out as potential precursors based solely on a rule-based approach, a metric called the Potential 
Problem Index (PPI) is assigned via a deliberative evaluation process, as discussed below. With time 
and experience. useful system-specific grading patterns may emerge that allow the evaluation process 
to become progressively more rule-based, but there will always be a need for eliciting expert 
knowledge within a structured deliberation format. 
The PPI is formulated so that anomalous conditions with a high PPI warrant further investigation of 
the causal failure mechanism and its effect on system risk; those with a moderate PPI warrant a 
recommendation for continued monitoring and trending of related anomalies that share the underlying 
failure mechanism: and those with a low PPI are graded out of the process as being insignificant to the 
risk metrics being addressed. 
Once an anomaly's causal mechanism has been generalized into a set of anomalous conditions and the 
requisite evidence has been collected. the deliberation-based grading process can be conducted. To do 
this, the failure condition index (FCI): and the conditional consequence index (CCI) are assigned after 
the underlying evidence garnered from the data collection exercise is reviewed and documented for 
each index assignment. 
The two indices (FCI and CCI) hinge upon what is defined as the,failure condition of concern. The 
failure condition of concern is a postulated failure state that could be caused by a failure mechanism 
acting at a susceptible location, which has the potential to propagate to severe consequences. A failure 
condition of concern: 
Typically corresponds to a genuine functional failure in a parlicular item, as opposed to that 
item being merely out of spec 
May vary from one susceptible location to another, even for the same failure mechanism, due 
to the different functions and system interactions associated with different components. 
Structures the assessment of susceptibility (and subsequent evaluation) by providing an anchor 
point for consideration of propagation pathways from the failure mechanism to severe 
consequences. 
In some cases, one or both of the indices will indicate very high likelihood or even certitude (i.e., cases 
where the failure condition of concern did happen, or where severe consequences are certain. given the 
failure condition of concern). In other cases, the situation is less than certain, and needs to be 
evaluated. It is important to keep a scenario-based perspective in mind when assigning FCI and CCI 
values to make sure that they are consistent with the definition of the failure condition of concern: the 
failure condition of concern upon which the CCI is conditioned should be the same as that used to 
assign the FCI. 
3.3. Evidence Caliber & Grading Results 
If the data type caliber of all the data used to evaluate FCI and CCI were 100%. and all the data were 
strongly applicable to their respective evaluations, then the PPI c o ~ ~ l d  be determined directly from FC1 
and CCI, and in fact would simply be the sum of FCI and CCI. In reality, there is no such thing as 
perfect and completely applicable evidence, so PPI also takes into account the evidence culiber of the 
data set used to support FCI and CCI assignments. For decreasing evidence calibers, progressively 
larger positive adjustments are made, resulting in correspondingly higher PPI values for the same FCI 
and CCI values. 
The evidence caliber itself is a function of the baseline data type calibers and assigned applicabilities 
of the supporting data used by the evaluation team when assigning FCI and CCI. For each piece of 
data, its applicability (expressed as a percentage) is multiplied by the baseline data type caliber to 
produce a Duta Caliber, DC. Then. the DC metrics are aggregated together to produce an overall 
Evidrnce Criliber, EC, in the following manner: 
In the above equations, M pieces of data support FCI asignment (Eq. 1 )  and N - 1%' pieces support CCI 
assignment (Eq. 2). 
Equations (1) through (3) define the data caliber aggregation within a single index (ECpcI and ECcci, 
respectively), and for the two indices combined (ECPPI). Aggregation within an index is treated as a 
coproduct. under the principle that multiple sources of evidence contribute to an increasing confidence 
in the assigned value. Aggregation across the indices is treated as a product, under the principle that 
each index is separately supported by its evidence, so that the evidentiary support for PPI as a whole is 
no stronger than its weakest link. If ECppl is low then one can conclude that there is some uncertainty 
in PPI, and therefore the grading should be correspondingly conservative in this case. 
The PPI is the grading metric for each anomalous condition which is the basis for the recommended 
further action ias shown in Figure The grading result specifies: 
Explicit analysis, in the case of a high PPI; 
Observation and trending, in the case of a moderate PPI; and 
No further analysis, in the case of a low PPI. 
For high values of evidence caliber, PPI closely matches the sum of FCI and CCI. For low values of 
evidence caliber, PPI is higher than the sum of FCI and CCI, indicating an upward adjustment to 
account for the higher uncertainty inherent in the FCI and CCI assignments. 
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Figure 4: Notional Graph of Recommended Further Action 
The lowest possible graded result simply indicates that the anomalous condition is not risk significant. 
The anomalous condition passed all prior screening attempts; however, upon evaluation. the assessed 
PPI indicates that the anomalous condition is within the safety envelope of the system and does not 
warrant further analysis. 
If the PPI of an anomalous condition is judged not to be high enough to warrant explicit risk modeling, 
hut also is non-negligible, then an intermediate grading recommends observation and trending of the 
failure mechanism to ensure (1) that the full history of the failure mechanism is brought to bear on the 
characterization of the spectrum of fault magnitudes; (2) that parameters correlating to anomaly 
occurrence and fault magnitude are identified: (3) that multiple occurrences of related anomalies 
(unexpected anomaly recurrence) do not pose an undue risk to the system; and (4) that adverse trends 
in frequency or fault magnitude are identified before they penetrate the safety envelope of the system. 
Once the finding is made, if the recurring problem analysis determines that the anomaly is not part of a 
recurring set of events, it is possible that the failure mechanism is deemed to be a low risk, or in other 
words "not risk significant.'' However. if there is anomaly trend that raises questions then additional 
modeling may he necessary to understand the trending pattern to ensure that the failure mechanism 
poses no significant risk to the system, or to redesign the system to preclude recurrence. 
The highest grading possible, risk modeling. is prescribed for those circumstances where the potential 
for severe consequences is too high to simply continue observation and trending. Risk modeling is 
discussed further in the following section. 
3.4. Risk Modeling 
Risk modeling is prescribed for all anomalous conditions above the upper threshold for observation 
and trending. The rationale is that a high PPI for a failure mechanism that has received the elevated 
PPI warrants an understanding of its risk implications. In accordance with the graded approach to 
system safety modeling specified in NPR 8715.3C [ I ] ,  the level of detail of the model should he 
commensurate with the magnitude of the risk. For example, if it is found that a risk model already 
exists for the anomalous condition, then the upshot of the risk modeling activity should be a potential 
change in the predicted frequency, reflecting the fact that elements of the affected scenarios have been 
observed, rather than a complete replacement of the existing risk model. 
As the previous paragraph implies. the risk modeling activity is meant to leverage existing analyses 
wherever possible, filling in any gaps that are found. These gaps may consist of scenarios that are not 
currently represented. or assumptions about scenario progression that are insufficiently substantiated 
by evidence to be confidently relied on. Sources of analysis information include Hazard Analyses, 
FMEAs, Critical Items Lists (CILs), and Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs). 
The risk models developed as part of the APA process should he phem)menological, in that they 
simulate the physical phenomena involved in the progression from failure mechanism to consequence. 
They should also be probabilistic, in that the uncertain parameters of the model are characterized by 
probability density functions (pdfs) as opposed to point values. This enables explicit calculation of the 
probability of severe consequences in terms of the fundamental uncertainties in the phenomenology of 
the system. Simulation of physical phenomena under micertainty is a known discipline, as described in 
references such as (41, 1.51 and [6].  and such models are referred to in the APA process as Purametric 
Probabilistic Models (PPIMs). 
Parametric probabilistic modeling combines statistical inference, logic-based modeling, and 
parametric functions to model not only how an initiating event can propagate in a time-dependent 
manner to a severe consequence but also how the likelihood of transitioning from one system state to 
another is governed by the underlying physical parameters involved in that propagation. PPM 
development can he complex and challenging, but is justified in the case of APA because (1) we are 
focusing on specific anomalous conditions graded for risk modeling rather than attempting to build a 
risk model of an entire system, ( 2 )  we must understand what physical parameters are driving the risk 
in order to implement effective corrective actions. and (3) if we don't understand how some of the key 
parameters are driving the potential accident propagation then testinglengineering analyses needs to be 
focused on gaining this knowledge and should he focused on characterizing the driving physicaI 
parameters. 
The example in Figure 5,  which presents a portion of a notional PPM, illustrates the fundamental 
attributes of a parametric probabilistic model. The anomaly failure mechanism (the initiating event in 
the sequence) produces a leak in a pipe containing flammable fluid. The functions associated with 
each event in the PPM. as well as the parametric connections between the events. are illustrated above 
the event tree. Note that the actual leak rate is uncertain, and is defined in the PPM as a pdf, 
representing the distribution of leak rates, given the anomalous condition. Combustion of the leaked 
fluid depends on the leak rate (e.g.. a certain amount of pooling may be required, or a combustible 
mixture is achievable only under a certain range of leak rates). The occurrence or non-occurrence of 
comhustion is characterized by a "fluid combusts" pivotal event, whose probability of occurrence is a 
function of the leak rate. If comhustion occurs, the resulting temperature rise might defeat the 
insulation protecting a needed backup system, resulting in system failure. To model this in the PPM, 
an "insulation fails" pivotal event is defined whose probability of occurrence depends on temperature. 
Thus. within the scope of this notional example, the possible sequences of events are defined by the 
pivotal events, "fluid combusts" and "insulation fails." 
In order to clearly indicate the significance of temperature rise in the sequence. an "insulation 
temperature increases" functional event is defined between "fluid combusts" and "insulation fails.'' 
This functional event takes the fluid leak rate as input and produces the insulation temperature. which 
is a function of leak rate, as output. Thus the probability of insulation failure is ultimately a function of 
the leak rate, and is therefore correlated with the anomaly fault magnitude. 
P(Combustiin,! Temperature Plins Failure) 
Leak Rate pdf vs. Leak Rate "9. Leak Rate "5. Tempeiablie 
isulation 
Fails Leak. Fire 
1 Fluid Insulation Temoerature 
No 
I'-Piii Leak and Fbre 
1 - Pic) Leak Only 
Leak 1 Comhusts lnc'reases 
Figure 5 :  Parametric Probabilistic Modeling of Pivotal and Functional Events 
Occurs 
In the APA process. the PF'M is exercised to generate a number of precursor risk measures 171. These 
measures are designed to assist the programlproject in identifying specific system configurations, in 
terms of risk model parameter values. that might represent risk-significant vulnerabilities in the 
design, operation. or condition of the system, so that specific recommendations can be made that have 
the greatest potential to reduce risk. Such recommendations might take the form of additional analysis 
and/or testing, in order to rcducc uncertainties to the point where the anomalous condition is 
adequately controlled, or they might take the form of design or operational modit>cations, in cases 
where the presence of a vulnerability is substantiated by the PPM. 
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The APA risk modeling process is illustrated in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6: Risk Modeling Process Flow Diagram 
4. PRECURSOR DESIGNATION 
Up to this point methods and processes for evaluating and grading anomalous conditions, as well as 
modeling and quantifying their risk significance. have been presented, hut in the end the process. by 
its very name. promises the identification of accident precursors. Unfortunately. you may be dismayed 
to learn that the process. in and of its self, cannot designate an anomalous condition as an accident 
precursor. This is because an accident precursor is defined not so much by the absolute values of the 
risk significance measures but instead by the way that those risk significance measures are interpreted 
by a program. 
The bottom-line is that the program must define criteria by which to designate an anomalous condition 
(whether actually observed or postulated) as an accident precursor. It is important that once the criteria 
are defined. they be adhered to. since not doing so relegates the program to the subjective type of 
attention given to anomalies that APA is attempting to remedy. Once an anomalous condition has been 
designated as an accident precursor. the information garnered from the risk modeling activity provides 
a means of focusing program resources upon the parameters and system states that either require more 
information or are explicitly driving the failure propagation to severe consequences. 
5. CONCLUSION 
In summary, the basic principles of the NASA APA process are: 
Anomaly data may point to failure mechanisms that, under different circumstances. could result in 
severe consequences. The prudent response to such anomalies is to assess this potential to assure 
that no unknown or underappreciated risks exist in the system. The APA process generalizes from 
the particulars of the observed anomaly to the spectrum of potential failures that share the same 
failure mechanism but which may occur in more severe form, at different times. or in different 
subsystems. 
Given that anomaly data sources contain a significant number of events having negligible risk 
implications. an efficient screening method is used to eliminate these events from further 
consideration while minimizing false negatives to ensure potential accident precursors are not 
missed. Anomalies which are retained are then qualitatively graded for continued observation and 
trending of the failure mechanism, or explicit scenario-based risk modeling. 
An effective APA process depends on a graded approach to anomaly assessment that includes 
rule-based screening, qualitative assessment and quantitative modeling. Quantitative modeling is 
used only as needed to understand the system risk attributable to the failure mechanism. 
Evidentiary support is a key element of the process. Failure mechanism generalization involves 
the postulation of fault magnitudes, propagation pathways and system stresses that may not have 
occurred within the operational experience base of the system. Thus, uncertainties are potentially 
large and care must be taken to avoid mischaracterization. The APA process explicitly weighs the 
evidence that is used to support the characterization of risk, implying where additional testing or 
analysis may be beneficial. 
Anomalies are significant to the extent that they either imply performance degradation of well- 
understood elements or reveal risks that were underappreciatcd or misunderstood prior to the 
anomaly occurrence. APA makes use of existing risk models to ascertain the risk significance of 
the failure mechanism, and entails additional risk modeling as needed to understand the physical 
drivers of that risk. 
The APA process is designed to produce actionable findings. It is expected that the findings will be 
available to the risk management system to support the development of risk-inhrmed 
recommendations for system operation and testing, as well as assessing the adequacy of any corrective 
actions that may already have been taken in response to the original anomaly. Therefore, top-level 
metrics that measure the risk importance of the underlying failure mechanism, as well as the 
associated physical parameters that may contribute to a catastrophic exacerbation of that mechanism, 
are key to the process. 
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